The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable: Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence by Vartabedian, Pamela
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 47 | Number 1 Article 5
1-1-2007
The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable:
Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of
Domestic Violence
Pamela Vartabedian
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Pamela Vartabedian, Comment, The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable: Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 47
Santa Clara L. Rev. 157 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss1/5
THE NEED TO HOLD BATTERERS
ACCOUNTABLE: ADMITTING PRIOR ACTS OF
ABUSE IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Pamela Vartabedian*
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence' is one of the most prevalent crimes
and frequently handled cases for prosecutors across the
country.2 Data from the American Psychological Association
(APA) indicates that one-third of all women will be assaulted
by a partner during adulthood.3 The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention reported that "nearly two-thirds of
women who reported being raped, physically assaulted, or
stalked since the age of 18 were victimized by a current or
former husband, cohabiting partner, boyfriend, or date."4
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1. There is considerable inter- and intradisciplinary confusion regarding
the meaning of the terms "domestic violence," "battering," and "domestic abuse."
See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1191, 1204 (2003) (explaining that in the scientific field, "spousal abuse,
domestic violence, marital assault, woman abuse, and battering . . . are used
interchangeably to refer to the broad range of behaviors considered to be violent
and abusive with an intimate relationship"); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic
Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 122-23 n.2. (2001) (adopting a definition
of domestic violence that includes "the establishment of control and fear in a
relationship through the use of physical violence, intimidation, and other forms
of abuse"). From a criminal justice perspective, domestic violence is defined
exclusively by existing criminal statutes. See infra Part II.D.1.
2. Jennice Vilhauer, Essay, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 953 (2000).
3. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, VIOLENCE AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS AND INTIMATE PARTNERS
339 (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius-03/pdf/03sec5.pdf.
4. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, FULL
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Nevertheless, when such domestic violence cases enter the
criminal justice system, prosecutions are difficult because of
circumstances unique to this crime that the evidence codes in
most jurisdictions do not take into account. 5
Currently, the majority of state evidence rules admit a
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence into evidence for
limited purposes other than to show that the defendant acted
in accordance with this propensity to batter, and only after
satisfying the state's balancing test between the evidence's
probative value and its prejudicial effect.6 Only California
and Alaska have enacted evidence codes that explicitly
provide for the admissibility of a defendant's prior acts of
domestic violence for propensity purposes in domestic
violence cases.7
In order to fully understand the need for change in
evidentiary rules, one must understand the cyclical pattern of
abuse and how this hinders the successful prosecution of
domestic violence cases. Part II of this comment begins with
a brief discussion of the cycle of abusive behavior inherent in
domestic violence crimes.8 Part II then elaborates on the
character evidence ban codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 4049 and its exceptions, 10 and explains how its
exceptions led California and Alaska to adopt evidence codes
that explicitly provide for the admissibility of prior acts of
domestic violence for propensity purposes in the prosecution
of domestic violence cases. 1 Part II concludes by explaining
the current scheme in the majority of state evidence codes
regarding domestic violence. 12
Part III of this comment identifies the problem with the
current scheme in the majority of state evidence codes. 13 Part
IV discusses how the current scheme in the majority of state
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
SURVEY 46 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.D.1-2.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.D.1-2.
12. See infra Part II.D.3.
13. See infra Part III.
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evidence codes does not adequately protect domestic violence
victims 14 and sets forth arguments in favor of a new evidence
rule that provides for the admissibility of prior acts of
domestic violence for propensity purposes. 5 Finally, Part V
urges all states to adopt rules similar to those of California
and Alaska that admit prior acts of domestic violence for
propensity purposes. 6 Such rules are needed in order to hold
recidivist batterers accountable for domestic violence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Cycle of Violence
Domestic violence creates a complicated relationship
between the victim and the batterer that is not present in
most other crimes. 7 The psychological interplay between the
parties is often set in place long before the battering first
occurs.' 8 Domestic violence generally cycles through three
periods: tension building, acute battering, and a honeymoon
phase. 9 During the tension building stage, the batterer, who
is usually charming at the beginning of the relationship,
becomes edgy and irritable, and verbally insults the victim in
ways that are meant to damage the victim's self-esteem.20
The batterer becomes gradually more abusive and the victim
attempts to placate the abuse to prevent the abuse from
escalating.2' This stage, which may last anywhere from a few
days to years, is often described as the most psychologically
damaging to the victim.22
The second stage is the violent phase, in which the
batterer engages in physical battering.23  The batterer
becomes enraged and violent for no apparent reason.24 At
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Vilhauer, supra note 2, at 953.
18. Id.
19. DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK:




23. See id. at 32.
24. Id.
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first, the victim often does not perceive any real danger.2"
Nevertheless, the battering becomes increasingly more
violent, and can sometimes end in the death of the victim."
The third phase is the "honeymoon phase."27 During this
phase, the batterer calms down and realizes that the victim is
hurt and may leave the relationship.28 The batterer is
remorseful and apologetic and swears that the abuse will
never happen again.29 The batterer will often promise to
change, bring the victim gifts, and shower the victim with
attention and romantic gestures. ° It is a period of relief for
the victim; the victim wants to believe that the batterer will
never engage in violent behavior again." Nevertheless,
unless there is an intervention, the cycle often begins again,
with the abuse becoming even more severea2 A batterer who
intersperses abuse with loving behavior is using one of the
most effective means of convincing the victim to stay in the
relationship.3
It is during the honeymoon phase that prosecutors
typically become involved in domestic violence cases, making
it extremely difficult for them to conduct proper
investigations.3 ' The victim perceives a loving and caring
partner, and may refuse to testify as a witness or may recant
incriminating statements made to the police. 35  The victim
may also be reluctant to testify because of intimidation by the
batterer, threats of retaliation, cultural or family pressures,
or uncertainty about whether the jury will believe her
testimony.36 Furthermore, victims of domestic violence may
suffer from Battered Women's Syndrome as a result of the
continued abuse, causing them to forget the details of the
25. Vilhauer, supra note 2, at 954.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 955.
28. Id.
29. BERRY, supra note 19, at 32.
30. Id. One woman noted, "He thought he could beat me, then take me to
bed and have sex with me, and that would make everything all right." Id.
31. See Vilhauer, supra note 2, at 955.
32. BERRY, supra note 19, at 32.
33. Id. at 33.
34. Vilhauer, supra note 2, at 955.
35. Id.
36. Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic
Violence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at its Past, Present, and Future,




B. The Ban on Character Evidence in the Federal Rules of
Evidence
In a court proceeding, issues regarding a person's
character arise in two fundamentally different ways.38 When
the character of a person is at issue in litigation because it is
an element of a crime, claim, or defense, evidence concerning
the person's character is admissible.39 For example, the
competency of a driver is a direct issue in an action for
negligently entrusting a motor vehicle to an incompetent
driver.40 The character evidence is direct and there is no
problem in limiting admissibility of this evidence.41 When
character evidence is offered "for the purpose of suggesting an
inference that the person acted on the occasion in question
consistently with his character," the evidence is
circumstantial and the Federal Rules of Evidence limit the
use of character evidence for this purpose.42 For example,
evidence of honesty is circumstantial when offered to disprove
a charge of theft and will be barred as character evidence.43
Federal Rule of Evidence 404,44 which addresses the
37. See Vilhauer, supra note 2, at 955. Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS)
"can be divided into three parts: 1) the traumatic effects of victimization; 2)
learned helplessness; and 3) self-destructive coping responses to the violence."
Id. "Women who suffer from BWS are less likely to respond to the violence
against them, and consequently, become more deeply entrenched in the violent
relationship. [They] are likely to be more reluctant to cooperate with
prosecutors, even though they are in great need of advocacy." Id. at 955-56.






44. FRE 404 states:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is
offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of
the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
162 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
admissibility of character evidence, is divided into two parts.45
The first part, FRE 404(a), establishes a general rule stating
that character evidence is not admissible as propensity
evidence, with three exceptions: (1) evidence of the character
of the accused or the victim may be admitted by the accused;
(2) evidence of the character of the accused may be admitted
by the prosecution as rebuttal evidence; and (3) character
evidence may be admitted to discredit a witness.46 If the
character evidence falls under one of these exceptions,
however, proof may be made only by "testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. " "
Accordingly, specific acts, such as prior acts of battering, may
only be admitted on cross-examination or on direct
examination where character is a central issue to the case.48
Even if character evidence is admissible under FRE
404(a), the judge has discretion to determine whether the
evidence is admissible based on the evidence's probative and
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
45. See id.
46. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
47. FED. R. EVID. 405(a). Rule 405 recognizes the three evidentiary ways in
which one can show character-by reputation, opinion, or specific instances of
prior conduct. See FED. R. EVID. 405. FRE 405 states:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant
specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a
trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim,
or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's
conduct.
Id.
48. See FED. R. EvID. 405.
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prejudicial value.49 This balancing test, codified in FRE 403,0
is a general rule applicable to all forms of evidence.5 The
rule requires the judge to weigh the probative value of
evidence against such factors as: (1) the danger of unfair
prejudice; (2) the danger of the evidence confusing the jury;
(3) the danger of the evidence generally misleading the jury;
or (4) the danger of the presentation of the evidence causing
an undue delay or waste of time. The evidence may be
excluded if the judge finds that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by any of these
dangers.53 The purpose of FRE 403 is to prevent a jury from
making inaccurate judgments based on emotion and to ensure
an orderly, efficient, and fair process of trial.54
Though prior acts may be excluded under FRE 404(a) or
FRE 403, there is another method which may be used to
admit this prior conduct. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
allows admission of prior acts for any relevant reason other
than to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the
charged crime.5  Under FRE 404(b), prior instances of
conduct, such as past crimes or wrongs, may be admissible as
evidence for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
knowledge, preparation, and intent.56  These purposes are
neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.57
Under FRE 404(b), evidence of prior acts is admissible
because it is distinguishable from character evidence. 8
Evidence of a defendant's prior acts admitted purely as
49. Michael S. Ellis, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 963 (1998) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note).
50. FRE 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 403.
51. Ellis, supra note 49, at 963.
52. FED. R. EVID. 403. "'Unfair Prejudice' within its context means an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
53. FED. R. EVID. 403.
54. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
55. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 284 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999).
56. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
57. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 190, at 284.
58. Ellis, supra note 49, at 967.
20071
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character evidence is considered by the jury in determining
the defendant's character and whether the actions in question
are consistent with that character.59 But when the evidence
is admitted under FRE 404(b), the jury no longer considers
the character of the defendant. Instead, the jury considers
how past actions reflect upon the state of mind of the
defendant. °
C. Additional Exceptions to the Ban on Character Evidence
in the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 was signed into law by President Clinton on September
13, 1994, and became effective on July 9, 1995.61 Pursuant to
the Act, Congress enacted FRE 413, 414, and 415, which
allow specific instances of prior conduct to be admissible as
character evidence against the accused in sexual assault
cases." By enacting these rules, Congress sought to ensure
that federal trial judges could admit evidence of a defendant's
prior sexual offenses in sexual assault and child molestation
59. Id.
60. Id. at 967-68.
61. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. app. art. IV, Fed. R. Evid. 413-15 (1994)) (effective July 9, 1995); see also
Ellis, supra note 49, at 968.
62. FRE 413, 414, and 415 read in pertinent part:
Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases.
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 413.
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases.
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of
another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 414.
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual
Assault or Child Molestation.
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an
offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule
413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
FED. R. EVID. 415.
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cases without having to stretch the meaning of the exceptions
under FRE 404(b).63 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) serves
as a model for most state evidence codes, and prior to FRE
413, 414, and 415, many courts narrowly interpreted FRE
404(b) and refused to admit evidence of a defendant's prior
sexual offenses unless one of the recognized exceptions was
clearly met.64
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 supersede
the restrictive aspects of FRE 404(b) in sex offense cases.65
These rules allow specific instances of prior conduct to be
admitted as character evidence against a defendant in sexual
assault cases.66 Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 are
specific to criminal cases of sexual assault and child
molestation respectively. 67 Federal Rule of Evidence 415
applies to civil cases.6' Therefore, prosecutors are able to
introduce evidence of uncharged past sexual misconduct in
cases involving sexual assault or child molestation to prove
that a defendant has the propensity to commit the charged
crime. 69 However, since their introduction, these rules have
been the subject of heated debate.70
The proponents of FRE 413, 414, and 415 argue that
sexual assault cases are often difficult to prove because of the
unique circumstances of these cases.7 Sexual assault cases
may be more difficult to prosecute because they typically
63. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 193 (2002).
64. Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 501, 514 (1995). Even courts
favoring a broad policy of admissibility with respect to past sexual misconduct
felt compelled to exclude prior acts evidence. Id. As a result of the
inconsistency in the law regarding the admissibility of past sexual misconduct,
victims were denied justice. Id.
65. 140 Cong. Rec. H8991 (1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
66. Ellis, supra note 49, at 968.
67. Id. FRE 413 provides that in criminal cases in which the defendant is
accused of sexual assault, evidence of a defendant's commission of another
offense or prior offense of sexual assault is admissible in sexual assault cases,
and jurors may consider this evidence to decide any matter to which it is
relevant. See FED. R. EVID. 413. FRE 414 sets forth the same provision for
criminal cases involving child molestation. See FED. R. EVID. 414.
68. See FED. R. EVID. 415.
69. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
70. Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence
and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 382
(1996).
71. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1123.
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become "swearing matches" between the victim and the
defendant.72 Therefore, evidence of the defendant's prior
sexual assaults may bolster the victim's credibility and lessen
the chances of the defendant's acquittal. Proponents also
argue that availability and use of these rules will encourage
sexual assault victims to press charges.74 Furthermore, a
person who commits one act of sexual assault is likely to be
the kind of person who would do it again, and thus,
supporters argue that these rules are "based upon reliable
indictors that lead to fair outcomes."75
Opponents of FRE 413, 414, and 415 argue that
defendants should be held accountable for "what they do and
not for what they are,"76 and that the new rules abolish the
defendant's protection from impermissible character
inferences.77 They claim that jurors are likely to judge a
defendant based on his uncharged prior bad acts and may
convict him on a "bad guy theory."7  That is, the jury may
decide that it wants the defendant punished because the
defendant is a bad person, deserving of punishment, and fail
to consider whether the defendant actually committed the
crime for which he or she is on trial.79 Furthermore, critics
argue that a person's past actions are not necessarily a good
indicator of their future behavior.80
D. Exceptions to the Ban on Character Evidence in State
Evidence Codes
Despite such debate, FRE 413, 414, and 415 have
72. De Sanctis, supra note 70, at 383. For example, in rape cases where
physical evidence is recovered, the defendant will usually use the defense that
the victim consented, turning the case back to the defendant's word against the
victim's. Id.
73. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1123.
74. Id.
75. Id. Supporters argue that FRE 413 "secure[s] fairness in administration
... and [promotes] growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id.
(citing FED. R. EVID. 102).
76. Id. at 1124 (citing Miguel A. M~ndez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People
v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for
Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
473, 475-76 (1995)).
77. De Sanctis, supra note 70, at 386.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 982.
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survived constitutional challenges."' Their passage has
sparked state legislatures to adopt similar evidence rules for
sexual assault and child molestation cases.82 Only two states
have further extended the reach of these rules by adopting
provisions allowing for the admission of prior acts of domestic
violence by a defendant for propensity purposes in domestic
violence cases.8 3 While no federal rule has been passed
regarding the admissibility of prior acts of domestic violence
for propensity purposes, both California Evidence Code (CEC)
section 1109 s' and Alaska Rule of Evidence (ARE) 404(b)(4)8 5
81. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1125; see also United States v. Enjady, 134
F.3d 1427, 1433-35 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding FRE 413 in due process and
equal protection challenges).
82. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2006) (permitting the admission
of a defendant's prior sexual offenses); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 (West 1998)
(admitting evidence of similar crimes in prosecutions for child molestation,
incest, and conspiracy to commit child molestation or incest); Mo. REV. STAT. §
566.025 (2000) (permitting evidence of prior similar crimes in prosecutions for
crimes involving victims under the age of fourteen).
83. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1125-26. Those states are California and
Alaska. See id. at 1132-44.
84. CEC section 1109 reads as follows:
Evidence of defendant's commission of other acts of domestic violence.
(a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other
domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the
evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
(2) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal action
in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving abuse of an
elder or dependent person, evidence of the defendant's commission of
other abuse of an elder or dependent person is not made inadmissible
by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section
352.
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this section,
the people shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance with the
provisions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the
admission or consideration of evidence under any other statute or case
law.
(d) As used in this section:
(1) "Abuse of an elder or dependent person" means physical or
sexual abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation,
abduction, or other treatment that results in physical harm, pain, or
mental suffering, the deprivation of care by a caregiver, or other
deprivation by a custodian or provider of goods or services that are
necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.
168 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
explicitly provide for the admissibility of prior acts of
domestic violence by a defendant for propensity purposes in
domestic violence cases.
1. California's Exception to the Ban on Character
Evidence in Domestic Violence Cases
The California State Assembly passed a law in 1996 that
waived the ban on propensity evidence in prosecutions of
domestic violence. 6 Later codified in CEC section 1109
(Section 1109), it is often referred to as the "Nicole Brown
Simpson Law" because its sponsors were outraged by the
exclusion of prior acts evidence in the murder trial of O.J.
Simpson." Section 1109, modeled after CEC section 1108
(Section 1108),8 permits the introduction of evidence of the
defendant's commission of prior domestic violence if the
evidence is not made inadmissible under CEC section 352
(Section 352).11 Section 1109 applies to the defendant's
(2) "Child abuse" means an act proscribed by Section 273(d) of the
Penal Code.
(3) "Domestic violence" has the meaning set forth in Section 13700
of the Penal Code....
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the charged
offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines
that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.
(f) Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative
agencies regulating the conduct of health facilities licensed under
Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code is inadmissible under this
section.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West 2006).
85. ARE 404 reads as follows:
(b) Other Crimes Wrongs or Acts.
(4)In a prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence or of
interfering with a report of a crime involving domestic violence,
evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by the defendant
against the same or another person or of interfering with a report of a
crime involving domestic violence is admissible. In this paragraph,
"domestic violence" and "crime involving domestic violence" have the
meanings given in AS 18.66.990.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4).
86. Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence
Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 701 (2003).
87. Id. at 701-02.
88. Section 1108 provides an identical exception for the admission of sexual
offenses in sexual assault cases. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1136.
89. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West 2006). Section 352 is modeled after
FRE 403 and states: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
2007] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 169
uncharged prior acts of domestic violence against either the
same victim 0 or different victims.9' It defines domestic
violence as "abuse committed against an adult or a minor who
is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or
person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or
has had a dating or engagement relationship."92 Although
this definition does not specifically mention rape as an act of
domestic violence, rape is included under Section 1109. 91
Evidence of acts occurring more than ten years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the
court determines that the admission of such evidence is in the
interest of justice.94
Section 1109 has been upheld against constitutional
challenges. In People v. Johnson,95 a California Court of
Appeal held that admission of evidence of a defendant's prior
domestic violence was not a violation of due process when the
evidence was admitted in a prosecution involving domestic
violence.96 The court ruled Section 1109 constitutional under
the same reasoning used by the California Supreme Court in
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006).
90. See People v. Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1026 (Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that the trial court correctly admitted evidence of defendant's previous
uncharged acts of domestic violence against the same victim under Section
1109).
91. See People v. Brown, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1332 (Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that the trial court's admission of evidence of defendant's previous
violent acts toward two other girlfriends pursuant to Section 1109 did not
violate defendant's right to due process).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). "'Abuse' means
intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or
placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury to himself or herself, or another." Id. § 13700(a). "'[Clohabitant' means
two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time,
resulting in some permanency of relationship. Id. § 13700(b).
93. See People v. Poplar, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1129, 1139 (Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that when prosecution charged defendant with rape of defendant's
girlfriend, evidence of defendant's domestic violence committed against former
girlfriends were admissible, even though Section 1109 and California Penal
Code section 13700 do not specifically mention rape as an act of domestic
violence).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(e) (West 2006).
95. People v. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 4th 410 (Ct. App. 2000).
96. See id. at 417-18; see also People v. Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1026
(Ct. App. 2000) (holding that Section 1109 does not violate the Due Process
Clause).
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People v. Falsetta.9' In Falsetta, the court determined that
Section 1108 does not violate due process by allowing the
admission of a defendant's prior sex offenses in a sexual
offense prosecution.98 The court in Falsetta stated: "[tihe
legislature has determined the need for [prior acts evidence]
is critical given the serious and secretive nature of sex crimes
and the often resulting credibility contest at trial."99 The
rationale underlying that opinion applied to Section 1109 as
well "since the two statutes are virtually identical, except
that one addresses prior sexual offenses while the other
addresses prior domestic violence." 1° Similarly, the Johnson
court deferred to the legislature's determination that the
policy considerations favoring the exclusion of evidence of the
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence in domestic
violence cases are outweighed by the policy considerations
favoring the admission of such evidence.'01
In People v. Jennings,"°2 a California Court of Appeal held
that admission of prior acts of domestic violence under
Section 1109 did not violate a defendant's right to equal
protection and that the trial judge had no sua sponte duty to
give a limiting instruction as to that evidence. In Jennings,
the defendant argued that by treating those accused of
domestic violence differently from those accused of other
criminal offenses, Section 1109 violated his right to equal
protection of the law.'03 Applying the analysis from People v.
Fitch,10 4 the court held that Section 1109 treats defendants
charged with domestic violence equally; the only distinction
the section makes is between domestic violence defendants
97. People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (1999).
98. Id. at 916.
99. Id. at 911 (internal citations omitted). In response to Falsetta's
arguments against the admission of propensity evidence, the court noted that
Section 1108 was only limited to prior sex offenses in prosecutions for sex
offenses (thus avoiding far ranging attacks), Section 1108 expressly allowed the
trial court to exclude evidence under Section 352 (allowing the trial court to
avoid mini-trials), and that Section 352 provided a safeguard against undue
prejudice. Hoover, supra note 90, at 418-19 (citing Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th, at 916).
100. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 417; see also Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th at
1027 (also relying on Falsetta to uphold Section 1109).
101. Johnson, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 420.
102. People v. Jennings, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (Ct. App. 2000).
103. Id. at 1309.
104. People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172 (Ct. App. 1997) (upholding Section
1108 on equal protection grounds).
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and defendants accused of other crimes. l 5 The court stated:
"The equal protection clause simply requires that, 'in defining
a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn
have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made." 0 6  In light of the special nature of
domestic violence cases, the court concluded that the
distinction drawn by Section 1109 between domestic violence
offenses and all other offenses is clearly relevant to the
evidentiary purposes for which the distinction was made.0 7
2. Alaska's Exception to the Ban on Character Evidence
in Cases of Domestic Violence
In 1997, the Alaska legislature passed ARE 404(b)(4),
which provides that in "a prosecution for a crime involving
domestic violence . . . evidence of other crimes involving
domestic violence by the defendant against the same or
another person ... is admissible."10  Like CEC section 1109,
ARE 404(b)(4) specifically allows admission of a defendant's
prior acts of domestic violence for propensity purposes.'0 9 The
rule even admits prior acts of domestic violence when the
charged offense is "interfering with a report of a crime
involving domestic violence." 10
Alaska's evidence rule provides many of the same
procedural safeguards to defendants as found in CEC section
1109.11 Prior acts of domestic violence are subject to the
balancing test of the state counterpart of CEC section 352
and FRE 403, and thus are not automatically admissible."'
Furthermore, ARE 404(b)(2) protects domestic violence
defendants' rights by insisting that the evidence of prior acts
must be less than ten years old from the date of the charged
offense, must be similar to the charged offense, and must
105. Jennings, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 1311.
106. Id. (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1975)).
107. Id. The Jennings court also held that Section 1109 does not violate a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. at 1314 ("A careful weighing
of prejudice against probative value under that section is essential to protect a
defendant's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.").
108. ALAsKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4); see also supra note 85.
109. Id.
110. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1141.
111. Id. at 1142.
112. Id. at 1141.
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have been committed upon persons similar to the victim."'
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) also withstood attacks
on its constitutionality. In Fuzzard v. State,1 4 the trial court
admitted the defendant's prior acts of domestic violence,
which included breaking into the victim's apartment and
pulling the phone from the wall when the victim tried to call
the police." 5 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
admission of this evidence was a violation of due process and
equal protection."' The Alaska Court of Appeals stated that
the Alaska state legislature enacted ARE 404(b)(4) with the
intent to expand the use of propensity evidence in domestic
violence cases in order to "resolve the difficult proof problems
posed by conflicting accounts of domestic violence." 7 Based
on the legislature's intent, the court concluded that the
evidence's tendency to show propensity could no longer be
deemed unfairly prejudicial."' In holding that ARE 404(b)(4)
did not violate due process, the court relied on a recent
decision in which it rejected the contention that propensity
evidence was "invariably so prejudicial as to destroy any
possibility of a fair trial."" 9 The court also held that ARE
404(b)(4) did not violate the defendant's right to equal
protection because the defendant failed to show how the
admission of prior acts evidence seriously infringed upon a
constitutional right.2 °
3. The Current Scheme in the Majority of State Evidence
Rules Regarding Cases of Domestic Violence
Unlike California and Alaska, the majority of states have
adopted evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' 2 ' Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows for
113. ALASKA R. EvrD. 404(b)(2); Kovach, supra note 36, at 1141.
114. Fuzzard v. State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
115. Id. at 1164.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1167.
118. Id. The court also stated that "[Alaska] Rule 404(b)(4) has adequate
safeguards to survive a facial due process challenge, [and that] the defendant's
prior misconduct did not place him at unreasonable risk of conviction based on
his earlier acts." Id.
119. Id. at 1166 (quoting Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Alaska Ct. App.
1997)).
120. Fuzzard, 13 P.3d at 1168.
121. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1118. By 2000, these forty-one states had
adopted codes based on the federal model: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
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evidence of a defendant's prior acts of domestic violence to be
admitted in domestic violence cases only when done so on a
noncharacter theory. 122  Therefore, in states that have
adopted rules based on FRE 404(b), prosecutors are allowed
to admit into evidence the defendant's prior acts of domestic
violence to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. 2 3 Although evidence of other crimes might logically
be relevant to the determination of guilt, FRE 404(b) excludes
such evidence if it is offered only to prove propensity. 124 If the
trial court determines that the proffered evidence is relevant
under FRE 404(b), it must still evaluate the evidence's
probative value versus its prejudicial effect pursuant to FRE
403.125
States often narrowly construe the admissibility of prior
acts under their counterpart rule to FRE 404(b). 126  For
example, Illinois evidence rules, based on common law,
support the traditional ban on admitting evidence of prior
acts for propensity purposes. 127  Prior acts evidence is
admissible for a range of other purposes, similar to those
found in FRE 404(b).128  Nevertheless, cases in Illinois
illustrate the difficulty prosecutors have in properly
admitting other domestic violence acts when the prior act is
factually dissimilar from the charged incident. 129 Therefore,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1118 n. 17.
122. See id. at 1127-28. It is important to note, however, that Colorado,
Kansas, and Minnesota have permitted evidence of prior acts of domestic
violence to be admitted under noncharacter theories not specified in FRE
404(a), but under more expansive theories unique to their own state efforts to
hold batterers accountable for domestic violence. Id. at 1144-48.
123. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) Senate Judiciary Committee's note.
126. See infra Part IV.A.
127. See People v. Kimbrough, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(holding that evidence of the defendant's other crimes or wrongful conduct was
not admissible to show the defendant's character or propensity to commit a
crime or wrongful act).
128. See id. at 1296.
129. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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there are presumably a large number of domestic violence
victims whose testimony of prior acts of domestic violence will
never reach the jury because of the state's adherence to these
strictly construed categories. 130
Hawaii has also stringently applied its state counterpart
of FRE 404(b). 131  Hawaii's Supreme Court overturned a
number of cases because of the trial court's admission of prior
crimes into evidence. 132  In many of these cases, while the
prosecutors appeared to meet the hurdles set forth by Hawaii
Rule of Evidence (HRE) 404(b), the court still used its
discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence. 133
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Batterers are not being held accountable for their crimes
of domestic violence because the majority of state evidence
codes prohibit the admission of a defendant's prior acts of
domestic violence for propensity purposes. The propensity
inference is particularly appropriate in the area of domestic
violence because of the on-going cycle of violence that is the
norm in domestic violence cases. "34 One battering episode is
likely to be just a small part of a larger scheme of dominance
and control that increases in frequency and severity. 135
Without the propensity inference, the escalating nature of
domestic violence is masked. 136
The majority of states allow evidence of prior acts to be
admitted in domestic violence cases only when done so on a
noncharacter theory, and not for propensity purposes. 37 Due
130. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
131. Hawaii Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible where such evidence is probative of
another fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident.
HAW. R. EVID. 404(b); see also Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth: Admitting
Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221,
231 (1998).
132. Lee, supra note 131, at 231.
133. See infra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. De Sanctis, supra note 70, at 388.
136. People v. Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1028 (Ct. App. 2000).
137. See supra note 121.
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to the difficulties in admitting prior acts of domestic violence
under these noncharacter theories, states are not adequately
protecting victims of domestic violence.13 The admissibility
of prior acts of domestic violence for propensity purposes is
necessary in order to deter future abusive behavior by holding
batterers accountable for their actions.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority of State Evidence Rules Unduly Restrict
Admission of Evidence of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence
Admitting evidence of prior acts on noncharacter
theories 139 proves difficult for domestic violence prosecutors
because courts often refuse to admit such evidence unless one
of the recognized exceptions is clearly met.140 Additionally,
the narrow openings through which evidence of prior acts
may be admitted under FRE 404(b) "do not reflect the
realities of domestic violence."'s4 Domestic violence cases
usually encompass a broad range of uniquely violent and
controlling acts which are dissimilar in their facts, such as
being slapped, kicked, pushed, choked, sexually assaulted,
shoved, or chased.14 ' The problem with FRE 404(b) is that
the noncharacter theories of admissibility require factual
similarity.143  For example, for an uncharged crime to be
admissible under the theory of intent, the mental state of the
defendant must be in dispute and the uncharged crime and
the charged crime must be "sufficiently similar to support the
inference that the defendant 'probably harbored the same
intent in each instance.'"'44 While repeated acts of battering
are similar in concept, as a part of the cycle of violence to
regain control and power, they are rarely similar in fact and
are thus unlikely to be admitted under this theory. 145
138. See infra Part W.A.
139. These theories include intent, plan, and identity. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
140. See, e.g., infra note 153 and accompanying text.
141. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1129 (internal citations omitted). Since most
state evidence codes are modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence, this
section will refer to FRE 404.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. De Sanctis, supra note 70, at 376 (quoting People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d
757, 770 (Cal. 1994)).
145. Id.
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Similar problems occur regarding the other theories
listed in FRE 404(b).146  Acts admitted on the basis of a
common plan or scheme are admissible only when the
defendant's bad acts bear a significant similarity to the
defendant's alleged actions in the charged crime such that the
"similarity is not merely coincidental, but indicate[s] that the
conduct was directed by design." 47 The identity theory,
which requires the highest degree of similarity between the
uncharged act and the charged crime, 148 is also not very
useful in domestic violence cases. "For identity to be
established, the uncharged misconduct and the charged
offense must share common features that are sufficiently
distinctive so as to support the inference that the same
person committed both acts." 49
If prosecutors are able to introduce evidence of prior acts
based on one of the narrowly construed theories of FRE
404(b), they face yet another obstacle. For an uncharged act
of domestic violence to be admitted into evidence under a
state law similar to FRE 404(b), it must also pass the
balancing test of the state counterpart of FRE 403.150 To pass
the balancing test, the uncharged act must be determined to
have a degree of probative value that is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.' 5 '
Illinois and Hawaii's evidence rules, like the majority of
state evidence rules, are modeled closely after the Federal
Rules of Evidence and admit prior acts evidence for the range
of purposes found in FRE 404(b). 152 The Illinois case of People
146. See id. at 376-78 (noting that acts admitted under the plan and identity
theory require a high degree of similarity which is often not the case in domestic
violence cases).
147. State v. Lough, 125 P.2d 487, 494 (Wash. 1995); see also People v.
Ewoldt, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 764 (1994) (explaining that in establishing a
common design or plan, evidence of uncharged conduct must demonstrate a
"concurrence of common features" so that the "various acts are naturally to be
explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual
manifestations").
148. Ewoldt, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
149. Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 190, at 284 (stating that for
identity to be established, "[tihe pattern and characteristics of the crimes must
be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature").
150. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
151. FED. R. EVID. 403.
152. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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v. Knight'53 illustrates the difficulty involved in prosecuting
domestic violence cases when the uncharged act is factually
dissimilar from the charged crime. In Knight, the defendant
was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and two
counts of domestic battery.15 The victim testified that after
she made a comment about a previous relationship, the
defendant began to beat her. 5 According to the victim, the
defendant grabbed the front of her shirt, threw her across the
living room, banged her head on the floor, kicked and
punched her, and pulled her up the stairs by her hands and
wrists.'56 The victim alleged that the defendant then sexually
assaulted her.'5 ' The jury convicted the defendant on both
counts of domestic battery. 5 8 However, the appellate court
reversed the defendant's conviction due to the admission of a
statement made by the defendant to the victim six weeks
after the charged incident. 15 9 He told the victim that "if [she]
ever slept with one of his friends again, he would break [her]
legs and kill [her] .... ,,160 The appellate court held that this
statement was irrelevant and that the "jury likely considered
it only as showing a propensity on defendant's part to commit
crime ."161 Due to the factual dissimilarity between the
charged incident and the other statement, the theories of
motive or pattern of conduct were not applicable. 162  The
intent theory also did not apply since the defendant's state of
mind was not at issue. 63
Hawaii's application of Hawaii Rule of Evidence (HRE)
404(b) has also been stringent.'6 Even if prior acts evidence
is admissible under HRE 404(b), the court still has discretion
to exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. 65 In performing
153. People v. Knight, 722 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).




158. Id. at 332.
159. Knight, 722 N.E.2d at 335.
160. Id. at 333.
161. Id. at 335.
162. Id. at 334.
163. Id.
164. Lee, supra note 131, at 231. HRE 404(b) is closely modeled after FRE
404(b).
165. See HAW. R. EVID. 403; see also Lee, supra note 131 at 231-35.
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this balancing test, the court takes into consideration the
need for the evidence, alternative methods of proof, and
remoteness in time. 6' It is often the case that the court
excludes prior acts evidence as too prejudicial. 167  For
example, in State v. Castro,68 the trial court admitted
evidence that the defendant, charged with the attempted
murder of his girlfriend, had previously "slapped her,
punched her, threatened her while wielding a knife, held a
gun to her head, raped her, and threatened her on the
telephone."69 On appeal, while the court acknowledged that
prior bad act evidence was relevant in the establishment of
the defendant's intent, the conviction was overruled because
the evidence was unduly prejudicial. 70 The court stated that
the evidence was likely to "weigh too much with the jury and
to so over persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge."' 71
In State v. Pinero,172 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
a year-old incident was too remote from the charged crime to
be admissible under HRE 404(b), even though the prior bad
act was remarkably similar to the charged crime.'73 The
defendant was charged with first degree murder for shooting
a police officer who was attempting to serve a temporary
restraining order upon him. 74  The defendant allegedly
grabbed the officer's revolver in a struggle and shot and killed
the officer. 175 On a previous occasion, at the same location
and under similar circumstances, the defendant grabbed the
revolver of another officer who was also attempting to serve
the defendant with a court order. 176 At trial, the State offered
this evidence under HRE 404(b) to disprove the defendant's
claim of accident. 7 7 Although the evidence was relevant, the
166. Lee, supra note 131, at 234-35.
167. Id. at 235.
168. State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033 (Haw. 1988).
169. Id. at 1039-40.
170. See id. at 1042.
171. Id. (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948)).
172. State v. Pinero, 778 P.2d 704 (Haw. 1989).
173. See id. at 711.
174. Id. at 708.
175. Id.




Hawaii Supreme Court held that the trial court's admission of
this prior act was an abuse of discretion due to its unduly
prejudicial effect. 178 In cases of domestic violence, where it is
often the case that prior acts of domestic violence occur more
than a year before the charged incident, such a stringent
application of this rule will exclude highly relevant prior acts
of abuse.
Finally, in State v. Pemberton,79 the Hawaii Supreme
Court again found evidence of a prior similar act to be
inadmissible under HRE 404(b). 180 The State presented
evidence that the defendant, on trial for an alleged stabbing
incident, had provoked a fight using a knife just a few weeks
prior to the charged offense.' 8 ' Although the trial court only
admitted the evidence for impeachment purposes, on appeal,
the State proffered the same evidence as relevant to the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense and to
rebut his claim of self defense. 1 2 Despite its closeness in time
and similarity to the charged crime, the Hawaii Supreme
Court held the prior evidence inadmissible because it "could
only prejudice [the] [d]efendant by showing [his] propensity
towards provoking fights with a knife: the very inference
HRE 404 was meant to prohibit."8 3
As the cases point out, courts have great discretion to
exclude evidence so unfairly prejudicial that it substantially
outweighs its probative value. This seems to be the usual
result in domestic violence cases due to the highly prejudicial
nature of prior acts evidence. 8 4  Nevertheless, while CEC
section 1109 is subject to a similar balancing test, courts have
taken into consideration the legislature's intent in enacting a
statute that admits prior acts for the purpose of showing
propensity in domestic violence cases. 85 In enacting Section
178. See Pinero, 778 P.2d at 710-11.
179. State v. Pemberton, 796 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1990).
180. Id. at 83.
181. Id. at 82.
182. Id. at 83.
183. Id.
184. See Lee, supra note 131, at 235.
185. See People v. Soto, 64 Cal. App. 4th 966, 984 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing
the analogous CEC section 1108). The Soto court stated:
[E]vidence offered under [Section] 1108 could not be excluded on the
basis of [Section] 352 unless "the probability that its admission will ...
create substantial danger of undue prejudice" . . . substantially
outweighed its probative value .... As with other forms of relevant
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1109, the California Legislature concluded that evidence of a
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence is sufficiently
probative to override the obvious prejudice to a defendant,
rendering such evidence admissible in new prosecutions
involving domestic violence against the same defendant. 186
B. Arguments in Favor of a New Evidence Rule that Provides
for the Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence for
Propensity Purposes
As described above, prosecutors face great difficulty in
admitting prior acts of domestic violence under FRE 404(b)'s
noncharacter theories. Due to the factual dissimilarities of
domestic violence incidents and the court's discretion to
exclude prejudicial evidence, an evidence rule allowing the
admission of prior acts for the purpose of showing propensity
would give the fact finder a more complete and accurate
picture of the defendant's ongoing abuse. Furthermore, there
are additional reasons to adopt such a rule.
1. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Are Probative in
Showing a Batterer Committed the Charged
Crime
The Federal Rules have recognized that certain evidence
should be admissible in sexual offense cases to show
propensity because its probative value sufficiently outweighs
its prejudicial effect.187 Prior acts of domestic violence are
also sufficiently probative to substantially outweigh the
unfair prejudicial effect of such evidence.' In fact, evidence
of prior domestic violence is more probative for showing that
a defendant committed the crime than it is in sexual assault
cases because the recidivism rate of domestic violence
batterers is higher than that of sexual abuse offenders. 8 9
"The American Medical Association found that 47 [percent] of
evidence that are not subject to any exclusionary principle, the
presumption will be in favor of admission.
Id.
186. Id. at 983-84.
187. See supra Part II.C.
188. See Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why
Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic
Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973 (2000).
189. Id. at 998.
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batterers who beat their intimate partners do so at least
three times a year, while the recidivism rate for sexual
offenders is only 7.7 [percent] within three years."190 The
high recidivism rate of batterers is likely due to the larger
scheme of dominance and control occurring in most
relationships that involve domestic violence.1 91
2. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Will Help Jurors
Evaluate Victim Credibility and Eliminate Juror
Bias
Like victims of sexual assault and child molestation,
domestic violence victims are often the only witnesses to the
crime, thereby making the victim's credibility central to a
prosecutor's case. 192  However, it is often the case that
domestic violence victims recant prior statements about
abuse or are unwilling to testify. 19 "Allowing evidence of
prior bad acts [would] help alleviate the difficult credibility
problems in domestic violence cases."194
If a victim or witness testifies for the prosecution,
admission of prior acts will help jurors properly evaluate the
victim's credibility. 95  Most jurors do not understand the
complicated relationship between the batterer and victim,
and may blame the victim for not leaving the abusive
relationship. 196  Without corroborating evidence of prior
abuse, jurors are often reluctant to believe a victim's
testimony. 97 Therefore, the admission of acts of prior abuse
will help eliminate juror bias and allow jurors to view
evidence from an unbiased perspective. 9 '
190. Id.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. Letendre, supra note 188, at 999.
193. Id. "The victim's reluctance may be due to a number of factors such as
intimidation by the defendant, including threats of retaliation, susceptibility to
the batterer's promises to cease abuse, cultural of family pressures, or
uncertainty whether she will be believed or that her batterer will be held
accountable." Kovach, supra note 36, at 1126.
194. Letendre, supra note 188, at 999.
195. See id.
196. See id. Many victims wish to leave abusive relationships, but do not
have the means to do so. For example, it is not uncommon for a batterer to gain
control over the victim's financial assets and isolate the victim. Vilhauer, supra
note 2, at, 959-960.
197. Letendre, supra note 188, at 999.
198. Id.
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According to survey comments and interviews with
California prosecutors, CEC section 1109 has proved
invaluable in convicting recidivist batterers. 99 Evidence of
prior acts assists jurors in their decision making by showing
that a person with a history of battering is likely to have
battered in the current offense.2 °°  Additionally, the
defendant's prior violent acts corroborate the victim's
testimony in the current trial.2 °' When the prosecution is
able to call prior domestic violence victims as witnesses to
support the current victim, defendants are less likely to get
away with fabricating the testimony.20 2
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4) has also strengthened
prosecutors' ability to prove instances of domestic violence. 20 3
Prosecutors state that ARE 404(b)(4) holds defendants
accountable for their actions by keeping the "focus [on] the
truth-seeking process."20 4  In one case, the defendant, a
recidivist batterer, kidnapped and beat up his girlfriend, who
had a substance abuse problem. 20 5 The prosecutor admitted
the medical records of the defendant's ex-wife, who had
previously been beaten by the defendant.2 6 The medical
records corroborated the victim's testimony of the defendant's
repeated abuse and assisted the jury in looking past the
victim's substance abuse problem and convicting the
defendant.2 7
3. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Will Help Prevent
Future Violence by Providing an Incentive for
Batterers to Seek Treatment
Holding batterers aacountable is also important in
preventing future abuse. In order to stop the cycle of
violence, batterers must' be punished for their abusive
behavior and undergo counseling concerning their repetitive
violent actions.20 ' The virtual certainty that prior acts of




203. Id. at 1143.
204. Id.
205. Kovach, supra note 36, at 1143.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Letendre, supra note 188, at 1003.
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domestic violence will be used against them in future cases
provides a needed incentive for batterers to seek treatment. 20 9
Additionally, evidence rules allowing victims to testify about
prior abuse may encourage victims to report domestic
violence.21 °
V. PROPOSAL
In order to adequately protect victims of domestic
violence, this comment urges every state to enact an evidence
rule that allows the admission of a defendant's prior acts of
domestic violence for propensity purposes.21' States should
model such evidence rules after CEC section 1109 and ARE
404(b)(4).212 The proposed rule does not restrict a jury's
consideration of the evidence to those enumerated categories
of FRE 404(b), but instead enables a jury to consider such
evidence for any relevant purpose, including propensity.
Admissible evidence of prior acts of domestic violence
includes any act between partners that satisfies the state's
definition of domestic violence. 213  Additionally, the proper
standard for proving that past conduct occurred under this
rule is by a preponderance of the evidence.214
The proposed rule also includes safeguards to ensure a
fair trial for the defendant and to guard against the historical
concerns of admitting prior misconduct. Evidence of a
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence cannot be used in
cases where its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the possibility that it will consume an undue amount of
time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.215  This
determination is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West
Supp. 2006).
212. See supra notes 84-85.
213. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(d) (West Supp. 2006) (stating that
"domestic violence" has the meaning set forth in section 13700 of the California
Penal Code). The California Penal Code defines domestic violence as "abuse
committed against an adult or a fully emancipated minor who is a spouse,
former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the suspect
has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
214. See e.g., People v. Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1030 (Ct. App. 2000).
215. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006).
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judge, who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.
However, to prevent the result that all prior acts of domestic
violence will be excluded because of its obvious prejudice to
the defendant, the proposed rule must explicitly state that it
is presumed that the probative value of prior abuse evidence is
not substantially outweighed by the probability that the
evidence will consume an undue amount of time or create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or
misleading the jury. The defendant must rebut this
presumption in order to exclude prior acts of abuse under this
balancing test.216 Furthermore, if the defendant is able to
rebut this presumption, the prosecution may then attempt to
admit a less prejudicial version of the prior abuse.217 This
evidence is subject to the same balancing test.
Additionally, prior to trial, the prosecution is required to
provide a defendant with adequate notice of the intended use
of such evidence and any statements of witnesses concerning
the prior bad act.2"' To ensure the probative nature of the
prior bad acts, this rule also requires that admission of
evidence be limited to those acts occurring within a specified
time period, such as ten years.21 9
The policy arguments that persuaded Congress to alter
the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding prior acts of sexual
assault and child molestation offenses apply equally, if not
more so, to domestic violence cases.22 ° As was the case in the
prosecution of sex offense crimes before Congress enacted
216. While Section 1109 does not explicitly define this as the appropriate
test, case law regarding the analogous Section 1108 has suggested a similar
result by considering the legislature's intent in enacting such a rule. See People
v. Soto, 64 Cal. App. 4th 966, 983-84 (Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Harris,
60 Cal. App. 4th 727, 737-40 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that different
considerations regarding the factors of Section 352 apply in the context of
Section 1108). However, to ensure that all courts follow this presumption, it
should be explicitly stated in the rule.
217. For example, the prosecution may attempt to admit the fact that
defendant previously abused the victim without admitting the brutal details,
photographs, etc.
218. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(b) (West 2006) ("[Tlhe people shall
disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a
summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, in
compliance with the provisions of Section 1054.7 of the Penal Code.").
219. See, e.g., id. § 1109(e) ("Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years
before the charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court
determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.").
220. See supra Part II.C.
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FRE 413, 414, and 415, admitting prior acts of evidence on
noncharacter theories proves difficult for domestic violence
prosecutors.221 The proposed rule eliminates this difficulty by
admitting prior acts evidence for the explicit purpose of
showing propensity. Additionally, the high recidivism rate
among defendants committing these types of crimes makes
prior acts probative of a defendant's propensity to have
committed the current charged crime.222 The proposed rule is
even more justified in the domestic violence context since the
recidivism rate of domestic violence batterers is higher than
that of sexual abuse offenders.228
Furthermore, the need to counteract juror biases against
victims2 24 and deter future acts of violence justifies the
proposed rule.225  The complex relationship between the
victim and perpetrator in both sexual abuse and domestic
violence cases, "with their unusually private and intimate
context," distinguishes these offenses from others.226 This is
especially true in domestic violence cases, where jurors often
do not understand the complicated relationship between the
victim and batterer, and may place the blame on the victim. 22
The proposed rule would eliminate such bias by corroborating
the victim's testimony with the batterer's prior acts of
domestic violence. By corroborating the victim's testimony
with the batterer's prior acts, victims would also be more
willing to bring charges against their batterers while
providing a much needed incentive for batterer's to seek
counseling.228
VI. CONCLUSION
Countless victims are physically abused by their partners
every day. Yet the majority of state judicial systems continue
to ignore this problem by prohibiting the admission of prior
acts of domestic violence for propensity purposes, creating
hurdles for prosecutors attempting to convict batterers. The
221. See supra Part IV.A.
222. See supra Part I.B.1.
223. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part IV.B.2.
225. See supra Part IV.B.3.
226. People v. Jennings, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1313 (Ct. App. 2000).
227. See supra note 195-96 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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California Legislature recognized the dangers inherent in
such a system and stated that "if we fail to address the very
essence of domestic violence, we will continue to see cases
where perpetrators of this violence will beat their intimate
partners, even kill them, and go on to beat or kill the next
intimate partner."229 In order to hold batterers accountable
for their actions, states must adopt evidence rules that admit
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence for the explicit
purpose of showing propensity. CEC section 1109 and ARE
404(b)(4) demonstrate a successful balance between the
search for truth and the defendant's rights. It is time for
every state to follow in these footsteps to help end the cycle of
domestic violence.
229. People v. Hoover, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1028 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
ASSEMB. COMM. PUBLIC SAFETY, S. REP. No. 1876, at 3-4 (1996)).
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